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ABSTRACT

United States-People’s Republic of China relations since 1972 have varied from warm to frigid. Of
most concern to U.S. policy makers and defense planners is the PRC’s military buildup absent any
real threat to her national interests in East Asia and her continued refusal to rule out the use of force
to reunite Taiwan with the Mainland.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is committed to insure that any reunification is by
peaceful means. This paper examines several possible scenarios in which United States military
force is used to back up America’s commitment to Taiwan should the PRC decide on military force
as the reunification option.
The paper hypothesizes that should conflict occur it will be between American-Taiwan forces, with
limited Japanese support, on the one hand, and the People’s Republic of China on the other. The task
of insuring Taiwan’s security will primarily fall on the U.S. Navy. The paper asks the questions of
whether the Navy is prepared for a naval war in the Western Pacific. Does it have the right ships in
the right numbers? The paper concludes that given the present downsizing of the Navy and the
buildup of PRC naval forces, it is questionable whether the United States would prevail should
conflict come in the early 21st century.
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AMERICAN MILITARY OPTIONS IN A
TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT
Absent the use of nuclear weapons, the outcome of a Taiwan Strait
conflict will largely, if not entirely, depend on the capability of American
naval forces in the Western Pacific. And if this is true, do we have the
right ships, enough of the right ships, and doctrine to meet the challenge?
Two seemingly unrelated events affecting the national security of the United States occurred in the
latter part of 1997. One was the inability of the United States to persuade the UN Security Council to
specifically endorse the use of military force should Saddam Hussein continue to bar UN inspectors
tasked with insuring the removal of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The second event was the
October visit of Jiang Zemin, President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the United
States. While several trade agreements were signed and declarations of future cooperation proclaimed, there was no perceptible movement toward settling the contentious and decades old Taiwan
issue. Like his predecessors, Jiang refused to rule out the use of force to reunite Taiwan with mainland China. For its part, the United States insisted that reunification be accomplished by peaceful
means.[1] In November 1997, mainland China’s position on the Taiwan issue was reinforced when
PRC premier, Li Peng, warned Japanese parliamentarians not to become involved in the Taiwan
issue. Li Peng’s concern was that a proposed revision of the present U.S.-Japan mutual security
arrangements did not define geographic limits with respect to what constituted a threat to Japanese
and United States national security.
If the use of force by the People’s Republic of China to bring Taiwan under mainland control is an
ever present possibility, and the United States remains committed to a peaceful resolution of the
issue, then the question becomes—what action(s) can the United States take in support of the Republic of China should the PRC resort to force and the rest of the world chooses to play the role of
interested bystander.[2]
Assuming diplomatic initiatives to resolve the issue are tried and fail, the American response will
largely depend on (l) the military action taken by the PRC, (2)
the actions taken by the Republic of China on Taiwan, and (3) the military capabilities of the United
States and the PRC at the time. Assuming the ROC responds unequivocally to hostile PRC
actions(s), the U.S. response will primarily be determined by considerations (l) and (3) as noted
above, i.e., the military option(s) chosen by the PRC and military capabilities of the contending
parties, including the capabilities of ROC military forces.
Time is also a factor, that is, the time at which a U.S.-PRC confrontation takes place. It becomes
important since it is unlikely that American options in a 1999-2004 time frame will be the same as
those in a 2004-2020 time frame given the modernization and continuing buildup of the PRC’s
armed forces, particularly its navy, and the continued downsizing of U.S. military forces in general.
Absent the use of nuclear weapons, the outcome of a U.S.-PRC conflict will largely, if not entirely,
depend upon the capability of American naval forces in the Western Pacific.
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Scenarios, beginning at the lowest rung on the escalation ladder, are described and commented on.
All scenarios assume diplomatic initiatives fail to end the threat. An imperative assumption with
respect to blockade scenarios is that ROC commercial links with trading partners be maintained. If
this can be accomplished, i.e., the blockade broken, then a successful outcome from a U.S.-ROC
point of view, is a certainty. An appropriate analogy would be the success of the West, particularly
the United States, in ending the Soviet Union’s blockade of Berlin in l949. On the other hand, if the
blockade is successful, time will be on the side of the PRC. No invasion of Taiwan will be necessary.
In due time, the PRC-ROC “dispute” will be relegated to the back pages of the media. And once that
occurs, the Republic of China on Taiwan becomes a part of history.
Scenario #l (1999-2004)

The People’s Republic of China threatens to halt ships calling at Taiwan
ports without prior PRC clearance.

The Republic of China begins to convoy ROC-flag ships and offers protection to foreign flag merchant ships in Taiwan waters. European Union member nations and most East Asia countries, including Australia and New Zealand, accede to the PRC demand. Japan and the United States do not
comply.
The likely U.S.-Japanese response would be to convoy or otherwise protect their ships in Taiwan
waters. Initially, Japan’s support would be limited to logistic support for engaged American naval
forces. In a 1999-2004 time frame the United States and Japan have this capability. American carriers would be positioned east of Taiwan but could, at some risk, enter the Taiwan Strait.
The likely outcome of this scenario, assuming no American or Japanese naval or merchant ship
losses, would be a diplomatic compromise, but one with Taiwan’s security left in doubt. There would
be no clear winner.
Scenario #2 (2004-2020)

The People’s Republic of China threatens to halt ships calling at Taiwan
ports without prior PRC clearance.

Most nations accede to the PRC demand. Of the major nations, only the United States and Japan
refuse to comply. In a 2004-2020 time frame, the PRC would have the capability of sustaining a
submarine threat in the waters east of Taiwan. Its air force and ballistic missile force (DF15/M9 and
DF-21) would be capable of inflicting losses on hostile naval forces in the Taiwan Strait, Yellow Sea
and the northern South China Sea. American carriers would operate further to the east, outside the
range of PRC cruise missiles.
The U.S.-Japanese response would be to protect their merchant ships entering and clearing Taiwan
ports. Anti-submarine capability would be crucial as would the ability to escort shipping. Any United
States deficiencies in this capability would quickly become apparent.[3] In addition to logistics
support for engaged American naval forces, Japanese naval units would be called upon to perform
anti-submarine and escort duties. Mine hunters and escort capable ships would be taken from other
U.S. fleets and theaters of operation.
Should the confrontation become prolonged, PRC mining of waters around Taiwan could logically
be expected. Mine hunting would be tasked to Republic of China naval units. At this point it is
probable that U.S. mine hunters would be based at the Taiwan ports of Keelung, Kaohsiung, and
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Hualien. An American option would be to mine major mainland China ports, but one that would be
vigorously opposed and condemned in the United Nations.
The likely outcome of this scenario would be ship losses much like the losses that occurred in 1941
when U.S. naval units escorted UK bound convoys part way across the North Atlantic.[4] Convoy
tactics would depend on the extent of PRC-claimed territorial waters around Taiwan, in particular
waters to the east of the island. A reasonable assumption is that the PRC would claim a minimum of
200 miles eastward and would interfere or attack shipping within this zone. A favorable outcome for
the United States would depend upon its ability to protect shipping within this zone. Assuming this
ability, time would be on the side of the U.S. and Japan. In summary, the strategies and tactics that
won the “Battle of the Atlantic” in World War II would be replayed in the Western Pacific. As in the
case of the 1999-2004 scenario, the confrontation would likely end in a compromise, but one that
guaranteed Taiwan’s security.
Scenario #3 (l999-2004)

The People’s Republic of China announces an air and sea blockade of
Taiwan, including mining of Taiwan waters.

Most nations accept the blockade and end commercial intercourse with the Republic of China. The
United States and Japan are the exceptions. The United States begins convoy operations in cooperation with ROC naval units. Initial Japanese support is logistical in nature for engaged U.S. naval
units. The ROC provides air cover for commercial ROC air carriers entering and leaving Taiwan. The
PRC threatens Japan if U.S. air bases in Japan are used in air operations over Taiwan. The American
response is to give the ROC Air Force sole responsibility for air cover operations but agrees to
replace ROC planes losses. American carriers provide air cover for U.S., ROC and Japanese ships
and planes entering and leaving Taiwan ports and airports. The carriers also become delivery vehicles for replacing ROC fighter aircraft losses.
Should the blockade be prolonged, Japanese naval units could be expected to provide escorts for
commercial shipping moving between Japan and Taiwan. In a 1999-2004 time frame the United
States, Japan and the Republic of China have the capability to break a PRC air and sea blockade. As
in the case of previous scenarios, ships from other fleets would augment 7th fleet capabilities. To the
extent that the 5th and 6th fleets are vital to American national security interests, then to that extent
would transfer of units to the 7th fleet compromise those interests.
The likely outcome of this scenario would be a Korea-type cease fire. There would be no winner or
loser. Taiwan would remain free but at a very high cost to its economy. The United States would
realize it might not prevail should two major naval undertakings against hostile forces occur simultaneously.
Scenario #4 (2004-2020)

The People’s Republic of China announces an air and sea blockade of
Taiwan, including mining of Taiwan waters.

Most nations, including those that diplomatically recognize the Republic of China, accept the blockade and sever commercial links with Taiwan. U.S.-flag shipping companies withdraw their ships
from Taiwan trade. The United States initiates convoy operations to resupply ROC equipment losses.
Convoys are made up of Military Sealift Command owned and chartered ships. Ships are crewed by
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volunteer civil service and commercial mariners. U.S. carrier groups are moved further to the east,
acknowledging PRC capability to inflict ship losses with cruise missiles. Japan reaches accommodation with the People’s Republic of China when Peking guarantees “freedom of the seas” with respect
to sealanes considered vital to Japan’s international trade. Peking agrees to UN oversight in this
respect. Japan reaffirms its mutual security treaty with the United States but backs away from any
involvement that does not threaten Japanese territory. Conflict, for all intent and purpose, becomes a
naval war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. American merchant and
escort ship losses continue. Replacing ROC fighter aircraft losses becomes increasingly difficult as
carriers move further to the east. The United States accepts PRC’s proposition of one country, two
systems. East Asian nations no longer view the United States as a major power in the region.
Scenario #5 (1999-2004)

The People’s Republic of China launches invasion of Taiwan with air
and seaborne troops.

In a 1999-2004 time frame this is not considered a likely scenario, primarily because the PRC’s
military buildup, particularly its navy, has not reached a point where it can openly challenge, that is,
can win a regional naval war with the United States, the Republic of China and Japan.
Scenario #6 (2004-2020)

The People’s Republic of China launches invasion of Taiwan with air
and seaborne troops.
The PRC threatens to retaliate against Japan, the Hawaiian Islands and Guam if the United States
interferes. Nuclear weapons are not an option nor is it a option to fight an all out war with the PRC.
Peking promises political and economic freedom to the Province of Taiwan at the conclusion of
hostilities. The People’s Republic of China points to the continued economic success of Hong Kong
under PRC rule and the political stability of this “special area.” The Joint Chiefs and the National
Security Advisor to the President advise that the U.S. Navy cannot win a regional naval conflict in
the Western Pacific against the People’s Republic of China. UN pressures the United States to accept
PRC promise of regional autonomy for Taiwan. Acceptance of these conditions ends America’s
presence as a major power in the Western Pacific.

QUESTIONS
With respect to conflict in the Taiwan Strait there are an infinite number of scenarios with an infinite
number of outcomes. What can be said with respect to the above scenarios is that a successful outcome for the United States is almost entirely dependent upon its navy. This paper raises several
questions regarding our naval capability in a 1999-2004 time frame and one from 2004 onward.
*Is the present and foreseeable 7th fleet capable of insuring favorable outcomes with respect to the
above scenarios and time frames described? If necessary, can sufficient forces be committed to the
Western Pacific without seriously degrading naval capabilities in other parts of the world, and in
particular without degrading the capabilities of the 5th and 6th fleets?
*In the above scenarios, having the capability to keep open commercial ocean trade routes and to
replace ROC losses is the key to a successful outcome for the United States and its allies. Can the
United States win a World War II “Battle of the North Atlantic” in the Western Pacific in the 21st
century? Is convoy doctrine studied and in place or has it been assigned to naval history books?
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*Aside from insuring that naval budgets are sufficient to maintain capable naval strike forces in
areas of the world important to American national interests, are the right type of ships available in
sufficient numbers to win a naval war with the People’s Republic of China? The Persian Gulf War
taught us that having an anti-mine warfare capability is very important in certain types of conflicts.
Do the naval forces of Japan, the United States, and the Republic of China have sufficient numbers
of anti-mine warfare ships and planes needed to successfully counter a PRC mine blockade of
Taiwan?[5] Are there a sufficient number of escort ships to secure trade routes to and from Japan
and Taiwan and the United States and Taiwan?
In the above scenarios, a major responsibility for anti-mine warfare was tasked to the Republic of
China. Has the ROC committed sufficient resources to this threat? Under terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has the option of selling defensive weapons to Taiwan.[6] Anti-mine
warfare ships and planes are in this category.
*Has the Republic of China made provision to replace its merchant ship losses remembering that
its merchant fleet will be scattered around the world at the time hostilities begin and that many
would be in near-China waters? Has it considered the outright purchase and maintenance of older
merchant ships in the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet. e.g., Victory ships capable of l6-l7
knots?
*Is a relatively expensive Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyer (DDG), for example, a
cost effective vessel for escorting convoys the final 200-1000 miles into Taiwan ports?[7] Could a
less expensive ship perform equally well when the primary threat to the ROC’s sea lines of communication in the foreseeable future is the submarine?
Can a case be made for acquiring a new class of escort vessels such as the Coast Guard medium
endurance cutter (WMEC)? In 1998, the cost of a state of the art, guided missile destroyer is almost
$900 million.[8] In contrast, in 1987 a Coast Guard WMEC cost approximately $30 million.[9] And
should this type of vessel not be entirely acceptable as an escort, could not our naval engineering
expertise make the needed modifications—even doubling the cost of the build? Or design a new, low
budget escort ship?[10]
*As the People’s Republic of China navy increases its capability to operate in waters east of
Taiwan, successfully defending entering and departing convoys will require committing major naval
combatants. Assuming some ship losses and battle damage, has the United States the combatant/
commercial ship repair capability on the West coast to meet this contingency?
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CONCLUSION
It can be hoped that the present policy of political engagement with the People’s Republic of China
will eventually lead to a more benign and less threatening regime. And that economic reform will
lead to political reform. But this is a hope only and is contradicted by the PRC’s massive military
buildup at a time when there are no enemies in sight.[11]
Should, however, a conflict with the People’s Republic of China occur, it will be a naval war. With
Subic Bay gone and the ever present risk that Japan will opt out as the PRC increases its military
capability, particularly guided and ballistic missile capability, the question that can fairly be asked is
whether the downsizing of the Navy is not a very high risk policy decision? Or put another way. If
the PRC decides to forcibly reunite Taiwan with the mainland—when will the decision be made?
The answer seems abundantly clear. When PRC naval forces can challenge the United States and win
a naval war in the Western Pacific. What should be American policy? Again, a simple answer. Never
allow the PRC the opportunity of mounting such a challenge.
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